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Abstract 
 
Emotional reasoning refers to the use of subjective emotions, rather than objective evidence, 
to form conclusions about oneself and the world (Arntz, Rauner, & van den Hout, 1995). It is 
a key interpretative bias in cognitive models of anxiety disorders and appears to be especially 
evident in individuals with anxiety disorders. However, the amenability of emotional 
reasoning to change during treatment has not yet been investigated. We sought to determine 
whether emotional reasoning tendencies change during a course of routine cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT). Emotional reasoning tendencies were assessed in 36 individuals 
with a primary anxiety disorder who were seeking treatment at an outpatient clinic. Changes 
in anxiety and depressive symptoms as well as emotional reasoning tendencies after 12 
sessions of CBT were examined in 25 individuals for whom there was complete data. 
Emotional reasoning tendencies were evident at pretreatment assessment. Although anxiety 
and depressive symptoms decreased during CBT, only one of six emotional reasoning 
interpretative styles (pertaining to conclusions that one is incompetent) changed significantly 
during the course of therapy. Attrition rates were high and there was not enough information 
regarding the extent to which therapy specifically focused on addressing emotional reasoning 
tendencies. Individuals seeking treatment for anxiety disorders appear to engage in emotional 
reasoning, however routine individual CBT does not appear to result in changes in emotional 
reasoning tendencies. 
Keywords: 
Emotional reasoning; cognitive bias; anxiety; CBT; treatment outcome; cognitive distortion. 
  
 
Emotional reasoning refers to a reliance on one’s emotional state at the expense of 
objective information when forming conclusions about oneself and the world (Arntz, Rauner, 
& van den Hout, 1995). Beck and colleagues identified emotional reasoning (also referred to 
as “mistaking feelings for facts”) as a key cognitive distortion that was considered to 
contribute to the development and maintenance of emotional disorders. In the context of 
anxiety, emotional reasoning has been described as a process whereby an individual may 
reason that “If there is danger, I feel anxious” and in turn assume that “If I feel anxious, there 
must be danger” (Arntz et al., 1995).  
 Emotional reasoning appears to characterise anxiety disorders. Arntz et al. (1995) 
compared emotional reasoning tendencies in treatment-seeking individuals with panic 
disorder, spider phobia, social anxiety and a mixed anxiety disorders group with a non-
clinical control group. In contrast with the control group, each of the anxiety disorder groups 
demonstrated elevated levels of emotional reasoning. Interestingly, emotional reasoning was 
not confined to situations relevant to one’s own disorder. For instance, individuals with panic 
disorder appeared to engage in emotional reasoning when imagining social anxiety themed 
scenarios. Emotional reasoning also appears to characterise posttraumatic stress disorder 
(Engelhard, Macklin, McNally, van den Hout, & Arntz, 2001), although it remains unclear to 
what extent dysphoria and depression are characterised by this process (Berle & Moulds, 
2013a, 2013b). 
 The extant literature then, provides some support that anxiety disorders are 
characterised by emotional reasoning, consistent with the assertions of cognitive models of 
emotional disorders (Beck & Emery, 1985). However, a crucial question pertains to the 
relationship between emotional reasoning and anxiety symptoms across time. If emotional 
reasoning contributes to the perpetuation of anxious affect, as cognitive theories of anxiety 
disorders would assert, then emotional reasoning tendencies would be expected to decrease in 
concert with reductions of anxiety symptoms during treatment of anxiety disorders. Unlike 
the extensive literature documenting therapy-related changes in other cognitive distortions 
described by CBT models – such as catastrophizing (Hicks et al. 2005) – changes in 
emotional reasoning have not yet systematically assessed in routine face-to-face therapy. 
 The present study aimed to investigate emotional reasoning in a sample of adults 
receiving routine treatment at a suburban clinic for the treatment of anxiety disorders. The 
two key questions were: 1). whether a sample of treatment-seeking individuals would 
demonstrate emotional reasoning, and 2). whether emotional reasoning tendencies would 
change during the course of routine cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for anxiety 
disorders. So far as the first aim is concerned, it was hypothesised that, consistent with the 
findings of Arntz et al. (1995), individuals seeking treatment for an anxiety disorder would 
demonstrate emotional reasoning. With regard to the second aim of the study, it was 
hypothesised that emotional reasoning tendencies would change in tandem with anxiety 
symptoms during the course of routine CBT, even if there were no specific interventions 
included in the treatment to specifically address these tendencies. It was expected that the 
skills that are conveyed to clients during standard CBT, such as seeking objective evidence 
for one’s assumptions and interpretations, would also be beneficial in reducing unhelpful 
emotional reasoning tendencies (where the “evidence” may not support an emotionally-laden 
inference). 
 Investigating these questions in a routine-therapy context necessarily lacks some of 
the controls that increase the internal validity of controlled trials that are conducted in 
research settings, such as manualised treatment, treatment fidelity checks, and prioritisation 
of participant recruitment and retention. However, on the other hand, recruitment through a 
routine community-based treatment setting allows improved external validity: it allows 
generalization of findings to the ways in which CBT is administered by practitioners in “real-
world” settings, where service demands and clinician resources can result in unavoidable 
deviations from empirically-based treatment protocols in order to tailor therapy to each 
individual client’s presentation (Verwoerd et al., 2013). The present study was conducted in a 
routine treatment setting in the knowledge that the findings would reflect relationships 
between these variables as they are reported by treatment seeking individuals in a routine 
community treatment environment. 
Method 
Participants 
 The sample comprised 36 individuals seeking treatment at a community-based 
outpatient anxiety disorders clinic (see Figure 1). 
 All participants provided informed consent to participate in the study and ethics 
committee approval was obtained from the Local Health District Human Research Ethics 
Committee. Participants were reimbursed at the rate of AUD$20 per hour for their time. 
Routine cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) 
 Participants received routine individual CBT from one of four experienced clinical 
psychologists at the clinic (minimum years of post-qualification experience = 5, maximum = 
13) and were assessed at the start of therapy (typically following one or two standard therapy 
assessment sessions, but before active therapy commenced) and after 12 sessions of therapy, 
or following their final therapy session (whichever came first)1. 
 The therapy interventions were not standardised, but rather, each clinician tailored the 
content of therapy according to the particular presenting problems of each participant. In this 
respect, the therapy reflected routine clinical practice at the clinic. Nonetheless, routine peer 
                                                 
1 We chose to conduct the “posttreatment” assessment after a maximum of 12 sessions as this corresponds to the 
number of sessions included in numerous CBT protocols. It also ensured some degree of consistency regarding 
the “dose” of CBT. 
consultation between each of the therapists over the course of a number of years (over 10 
years in the case of three of the therapists) has helped to ensure a degree of consistency in the 
way in which cases are formulated and treated. Additionally, a record was kept of the focus 
of each therapy session to provide a general overview of the nature of therapy that 
participants received. 
Measures 
Semi-structured diagnostic interview 
 All participants were administered the Mini Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; 
Sheehan et al., 1998) by the same researcher (DB) to determine primary and co-occurring 
DSM-IV diagnoses (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Thirteen interviews were 
recorded and co-rated by an independent rater (a clinical psychologist of 10 years 
experience)2. There was 100% agreement between raters for diagnoses of panic disorder, 
generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and social anxiety disorder. There were two 
disagreements across the 13 interviews rated for obsessive-compulsive disorder and major 
depression (i.e., 84.6% agreement; Cohen's Kappa = 0.68). 
Self-report questionnaires 
The following self-report questionnaires were administered: 
 The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item 
self-report scale that assesses common features of anxiety, such as nervousness, a fear of 
losing control, and somatic aspects of anxiety. Each item is rated on a four-point scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely) and a total score is calculated by summing the item 
scores. The BAI has shown satisfactory test-retest reliability over 5-weeks in panic disorder 
and agoraphobia patients (r = 0.83; de Beurs, Wilson, Chambless, Goldstein, & Feske, 1997) 
                                                 
2 The interrater analysis for the diagnosis of GAD was based on 12 rather than 13 co-ratings due to a fault with 
one of the recordings. 
and it has good concurrent validity with other anxiety scales (e.g., r = 0.81 with the SCL-90R 
[Derogatis, 1983] anxiety subscale; Steer, Ranieri, Beck, & Clark, 1993). In the present 
sample, the internal consistency (Cronbach’s α) was 0.96. 
 The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item 
self-report scale that assesses symptoms of depression. Each item is rated on a four-point 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely) and a total score is obtained by summing the 
item scores. Patients diagnosed with major depression have been found to score higher on the 
BDI-II than those without depression (Arnau, Meagher, Norris, & Bramson, 2001) and the 
BDI-II correlates more strongly with other measures of depression than with measures of 
anxiety (Beck et al., 1996). In the present sample, the internal consistency of the BDI-II was 
0.93. 
 The Beliefs about Emotions Questionnaire (BEQ), Cognitive Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (CERQ) and Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS) were also 
administered, however the results for these are not reported here as they were included for the 
purpose of assessing thematically unrelated research questions that will be reported 
elsewhere. 
Experimental emotional reasoning task 
 Participants were also administered an emotional reasoning experimental procedure. 
The procedure was based on the scenario-based procedure of that of Arntz et al. (1995) which 
has been used in numerous studies of both children (e.g., Muris, Merkelbach, & van 
Spauwen, 2003) and adults (e.g., Engelhard et al., 2001). 
For the purpose of this study, we used four anxiety-themed scenarios. Two of the 
scenarios pertained to panic attacks and agoraphobia (feeling a pain in one’s chest on the way 
to the local shopping centre and feeling breathless on a crowded train); one to generalised 
anxiety disorder (receiving a late bill and worrying about how to pay it); and one to health 
anxiety (noticing a spot on one’s skin and wondering if it’s cancer). In developing the 
scenarios, we gave a relatively greater focus to panic disorder than to other anxiety disorders, 
as panic disorder with or without agoraphobia has historically comprised about half of the 
overall diagnostic mix for individuals attending the Nepean Anxiety Disorders Clinic. 
Participants were asked to vividly imagine themselves in the situation described by each of 
the scenarios. Each of the four scenarios were presented four times during each assessment 
appointment with a different ending each time: (1). objectively neutral and with a non-
valenced emotional response, (2). objectively neutral with an anxious response, (3). 
objectively negative ending and a non-valenced emotional response, and (4). objectively 
negative ending with an anxious response. For instance, the four variations of the first 
scenario were as follows: 
1a. As you walk towards your local shopping centre to buy some groceries, you start to notice 
that you feel hot and a little bit weak. You are not bothered by this and you remind yourself 
that it’s a very hot day. (neutral situation and non-anxious emotional response). 
1b. As you walk towards your local shopping centre to buy some groceries, you start to notice 
that you feel hot and a little bit weak. You start to feel anxious and fearful. (neutral situation 
and anxious emotional response). 
1c. As you walk towards your local shopping centre to buy some groceries, you start to feel a 
crushing pain in your chest and tingling in your arms. You’re not bothered by this and remind 
yourself that it may just be a “stitch” or some momentary passing sensations. (objectively 
threatening situation and non-anxious emotional response). 
1d. As you walk towards your local shopping centre to buy some groceries, you start to feel a 
crushing pain in your chest and tingling in your arms. You feel terrified about what this might 
mean. (objectively threatening situation and anxious emotional response). 
 Each scenario and the respective endings are included in Supplementary file 1. 
 Participants were asked to provide the following ratings for each of the four scenarios 
(i.e., six ratings for each of four endings of each of four scenarios = 96 ratings in total): 
1. How dangerous is this? 
2. How negative is this? 
3. How likely is it that something bad will occur? 
4. How likely is it that you would be unable to cope? 
5. How incompetent does this situation suggest that you are? 
6. How bad is the worst possible outcome in this situation? 
The first rating of perceived danger was used for consistency with the study 
of Arntz et al. (1995; where ratings of danger were the primary anxiety dependent variable). 
Ratings 2 and 3 were intended to capture estimates of perceived likelihood of unfavourable 
outcomes and rating 6 was included to capture the perceived cost of the unfavourable event, 
consistent with notions that threat appraisals are driven by perceived probability and cost 
estimates (Uren, Szabό, & Lovibond, 2004). Ratings 2, 4 and 5 were included as they 
appeared relevant on the basis of clinical experience. Consistent with previous researchers 
who have used the scenarios-based emotional reasoning procedure (Berle & Moulds, 2013a, 
2013b; Engelhard et al., 2001), we defined emotional reasoning as the difference between the 
respective ratings of scenarios with and without anxiety-response information included. In 
this respect, emotional reasoning scores were not so much a reflection of the content of the 
scenarios themselves, but rather, an index of the extent to which anxiety-related emotions are 
associated with negatively-toned interpretations. 
Posttreatment assessment 
 At the posttreatment assessment, all self-report questionnaire measures were re-
administered as well as the experimental emotional reasoning procedure. The posttreatment 
emotional reasoning items were the same as those administered at the pretreatment 
assessment. Previous research indicates that scores on the scenarios-based emotional 
reasoning procedure have adequate test-retest reliability (test-retest score correlations of 0.75 
across 2-6 weeks in Arntz et al. 1995), thus providing confidence that changes in scores on 
the task may reflect actual changes in emotional reasoning as opposed to measurement error. 
Data analyses 
All analyses were conducted in SPSS version 22. Chi-square and independent samples 
t-tests were used to compare the demographic and clinical characteristics of participants who 
did and did not complete therapy 
To determine whether emotional reasoning scores changed between pre and 




 Table 1 summarises the sample characteristics at the pretreatment assessment. 
  Thirty-three participants (91.7%) had at least one co-occurring diagnosis at the 
pretreatment assessment3. The numbers and proportions of participants with co-occurring 
diagnoses is outlined in Table 2. 
Emotional reasoning tendencies at pretreatment 
 The first hypothesis of the study was that individuals seeking treatment for an anxiety 
disorder would demonstrate emotional reasoning tendencies. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
all emotional reasoning difference scores were significantly greater than zero (all ps < 0.05 
and significant after correction for multiple comparisons), suggesting that participants rated 
situations as more dangerous/negative when an anxious emotional response was indicated. 
                                                 
3 For the purpose of the present study, a participant’s “primary” disorder was the condition that the individual 
was seeking help for and considered to be the most interfering in their life currently. 
The means (M), t-values, p-values and Cohen’s d effect-sizes for the ratings were as follows 
(all df = 35): how dangerous the situation is (M = 16.85, t = 7.05, p < 0.0001, d = 1.18); how 
negative the situation is (M = 19.28, t = 8.36, p < 0.0001, d = 1.39); how likely that 
something bad will occur (M = 16.86, t = 6.86, p < 0.0001, d = 1.14); how likely that unable 
to cope (M = 16.37, t = 7.64, p < 0.0001, d = 1.27); how incompetent the situation suggests 
that the respondent is (M = 10.35, t = 4.71, p <0.0001, d = 0.79); and how bad is the worst 
possible outcome is (M = 14.50, t = 8.11, p<0.0001, d = 1.35). 
Posttreatment sample 
 Complete posttreatment data was collected from 25 of the participants, corresponding 
to 69.4 percent of the pretreatment sample. For practical reasons, the data were aggregated 
and analysed before 4 of the participants (11.1% of the pretreatment sample) - for whom 
there was pretreatment data - had reached the posttreatment assessment point (i.e., they were 
still receiving active therapy at the time the data collection ceased). The reasons for 
participant attrition were not always clear as not all participants (n = 8) could be contacted 
regarding the posttreatment session. However, it was noted that one participant discontinued 
the study following a diagnosis of breast cancer during the study, one participant moved 
interstate, and one participant repeatedly did not attend their scheduled posttreatment 
assessment appointment. 
 There were no significant differences between the groups of participants with and 
without posttreatment data on any of the demographic variables, in terms of the presence of a 
medical condition, the use of psychotropic medication, engagement in therapy elsewhere, or 
in terms of the presence or absence of any given MINI-derived DSM-IV diagnosis. The 
presence of current alcohol abuse was an exception, with proportionately more individuals 
with compared to without alcohol abuse not attending the posttreatment session (80.0% 
versus 22.5%, respectively; χ2 = 6.69, df = 1, p = 0.01). 
 It is also noteworthy that the median number of sessions completed between the pre 
and posttreatment assessments was 9 sessions (Mean = 8.20; SD = 3.08; see Figure 1) and the 
median number of sessions that participants had attended in total by the posttreatment 
assessment was 10 (Mean = 10.12; SD = 3.17). There were 3 participants from whom 
posttreatment data was collected within 4 sessions of the pretreatment session. This was 
either because improvement with treatment was rapid such that the participant did not feel the 
need to attend additional sessions (n = 1) or because the participant concluded therapy for 
some other reason but was still able to attend the posttreatment assessment (n = 2). Each of 
these individuals was included in the analysis. 
 The mean duration of therapy between the pre and post-treatment assessments was 
21.04 weeks (SD = 11.11; Median = 17). The variability in treatment duration is consistent 
with the fact that therapy was based on individually tailored case formulation rather than a 
manualised approach, such that less frequent appointments were arranged with some 
participants towards the end of therapy to ensure that their progress persisted. 
 Following the administration of the posttreatment emotional reasoning items, 
participants were asked to what extent they believed that they remembered each of the 
emotional reasoning items from the pretreatment assessment (on a scale from 0 = "Each item 
seemed completely new to me" to 100 = "I could remember almost every single situation 
extremely well"). The mean rating was 62.8 (SD = 23.54), suggesting at least some level of 
familiarity with each of the items. 
Changes in symptom scores from pre to posttreatment 
 As could be expected, the symptom scores for anxiety and depression decreased 
significantly between the pre and posttreatment assessments (repeated measures t-test 95% CI 
[4.60, 17.24] for BAI; repeated measures t-test 95% CI [4.92, 13.64] for BDI-II; see Figure 
2). The effect sizes for change on the BAI and BDI-II were 0.75 and 0.71, respectively4. 
 Given the high rate of participant attrition, intent-to-treat analyses were also 
conducted. Again, the reductions in BAI and BDI-II scores were significant (repeated 
measures t-test 95% CIs [2.96, 12.21] & [3.14, 9.75] for BAI and BDI-II, respectively). 
Changes in emotional reasoning scores from pre to posttreatment. 
 The second hypothesis of this study was that emotional reasoning scores would 
decrease during a successful course of CBT for anxiety. Figure 3 summarises the patterns of 
scores for each of the respective emotional reasoning ratings at pre and posttreatment. Only 
one of the emotional reasoning scores changed to a significant extent during the course of 
therapy: ratings of incompetence decreased to a significant extent after controlling for 
multiple comparisons (pretreatment mean = 11.54 [SD = 13.22]; posttreatment mean = 3.85 
[SD = 13.97]; repeated measures t-test 95% CI [2.13, 13.24]; see Figure 3). When an intent to 
treat analysis was conducted, the decrease in emotional reasoning incompetence ratings 
remained significant (repeated measures t-test 95% CI [1.38, 9.30]). 
Association between change in emotional reasoning for incompetence and changes in anxiety 
and depression. 
 The sample of participants completing treatment was small in size (n = 25). However, 
a post-hoc exploratory non-parametric correlation analysis5 was nonetheless conducted to 
determine whether decreases in emotional reasoning ratings for incompetence were 
associated with decreases in anxiety and depressive symptoms from pre to post therapy, as 
this bears upon an important question: Do changes in emotional reasoning scores occur in 
                                                 
4 The effect size was calculated as: (𝑋𝑋
�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃 −𝑋𝑋�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠
 
5 A non-parametric correlation analysis (Kendall's τb) was conducted given that the distribution of the overall 
population could not be assumed from the small sample of 25 participants from whom there was posttreatment 
data. 
concert with changes in anxiety and depressive symptoms? Change in emotional reasoning 
ratings of incompetence was positively correlated with change in BDI-II symptoms 
(Kendall's τb = 0.21), although this correlation was not statistically significant in this small 
sample. The correlation between change in incompetence ratings and BAI scores was also 
0.21 (Kendall's τb), although again, this was not statistically significant. 
Association between pretreatment emotional reasoning scores and change in anxiety and 
depressive symptoms. 
Given that high levels of emotional reasoning appear to be associated with elevated 
levels of anxiety symptoms (Arntz et al., 1995), it is plausible that high pretreatment levels of 
emotional reasoning may predict an attenuated degree of improvement in anxiety symptoms 
during a course of therapy. With this in mind, a further post-hoc correlation analysis was 
conducted to determine whether (high) levels of pretreatment emotional reasoning tendencies 
were associated with reduced improvements in anxiety and depressive symptoms during the 
course of therapy. Only pretreatment scores for how negative the situation was were 
associated with reduced degree of improvement in BAI symptoms (Kendall's τb = -0.34, p = 
0.02): the other five emotional reasoning scores were not associated with the degree of 
improvement in BAI symptoms during the course of therapy.Discussion 
 This study aimed to determine whether a sample of individuals seeking treatment for 
an anxiety disorder demonstrated emotional reasoning tendencies. Consistent with the 
findings of Arntz et al. (1995), participants appeared to engage in emotional reasoning, as 
evidenced by emotional reasoning difference scores that were significantly greater than zero. 
In other words, averaged across the “objective” nature of scenario outcomes, participants 
tended to rate situations as more dangerous when an anxious emotional response was 
indicated. 
The present findings also extend those of Arntz et al. (1995) in that emotional 
reasoning tendencies were not only demonstrated for interpretations of how dangerous 
situations were, but also regarding how negative situations were perceived to be, as well as 
for ratings of how likely something bad was to occur, whether one would be able to cope, 
how incompetent the situation suggests that one is, as well as how bad the worst possible 
outcome would be. Thus, emotional reasoning was evident for both the perceived likelihood 
and cost of the situations as well as how incompetent one believes that one would be, this 
latter rating pertaining perhaps as much to depression as to anxiety per se. In other words, 
emotional reasoning appeared to be associated with a wide range of anxiety-related 
interpretations, not just the perceived danger of each given situation. 
 The second aim of the study was to determine whether emotional reasoning 
tendencies change during a routine course of individual CBT. This has not been investigated 
previously. In this respect, aside from emotional reasoning pertaining to one's perceived 
(in)competence, other emotional reasoning tendencies did not appear to change, even though 
participants significantly improved in anxiety and depressive symptoms. One can only 
speculate as to why incompetence-related emotional reasoning changed significantly when 
other emotional reasoning tendencies did not. Perhaps it is easier for individuals to learn to 
disentangle their emotional states at particular moments from (over)general interpretations of 
their competence than it is from interpretations about what might happen in the specific 
situation. However, if that was the case, it seems reasonable to also expect parallel reductions 
in ratings of being ‘unable to cope’, a similarly general interpretation. 
  Other emotional reasoning tendencies did not significantly change during the course 
of therapy. There are various explanations that could account for these findings. First, the 
apparent stability of emotional reasoning tendencies in both the present study and in previous 
prospective investigations of the construct (Berle & Moulds, 2013a, 2013b) suggest that 
emotional reasoning might serve as a longstanding and potentially premorbid risk factor that 
increases an individual’s risk of developing an anxiety disorder. Second the study serves only 
as a preliminary investigation and the sample size was too small to detect anything other than 
very large variations in emotional reasoning at both pre and posttreatment. Third, it is 
possible that emotional reasoning tendencies may take longer to change than the eight 
sessions (on average) that participants received between the pre and posttreatment 
assessments in the present study - or that emotional reasoning tendencies might change 
secondarily, once symptoms of anxiety and depression have already decreased. Fourth, it is 
possible that the scenarios-based procedure is insensitive to changes in emotional reasoning 
with treatment or that the posttreatment ratings were influenced by a practice/recall effect 
given that participants indicated at least some level of familiarity with each of the rated 
situations at posttreatment. Finally, the specific content of therapy sessions was not recorded, 
so it is not possible to determine to what extent emotional reasoning tendencies were 
recognised, discussed and addressed in therapy, and to what extent this may have varied 
between participants. On the one hand, the fact that therapists were using CBT-based 
approaches, and that the central place of emotional reasoning as a cognitive distortion in 
mainstream cognitive behavioural models of anxiety disorders, suggests that it would likely 
have been discussed at some point during therapy. On the other hand, participants received 
cognitive behavioural "treatment as usual" which did not include any prescribed content 
pertaining to emotional reasoning, so for many of the participants, the concept of emotional 
reasoning may have never been explicitly discussed or targeted in therapy at all. Preliminary 
evidence from a study where an experimental computerised task was used to modify the 
emotional reasoning tendencies of spider phobics (Lommen, Engelhard, van den Hout, Arntz, 
2013) provides promise that specific strategies might be developed to address emotional 
reasoning in routine therapy settings as well. 
  Conclusions from the present study need to be tempered by its limitations. The study 
lacked a control group. A non-clinical control group would have allowed direct comparison 
between the clinical and non-clinical participants to determine whether emotional reasoning 
is more prominent in individuals seeking treatment for an anxiety disorder compared with 
those in the population at large. However, the findings of Arntz et al. (1995) have already 
provided some support for this possibility. There may have been variations in how CBT was 
administered between therapists, and the small size of the sample precluded a statistical 
control of this. Also, many participants required more than 12 sessions of therapy, such that 
the “posttreatment” assessment may have occurred before additional gains were made. 
Perhaps emotional reasoning is a process that takes longer to change than other cognitive 
processes and biases. Finally, the sample comprised a heterogeneous group of individuals 
with anxiety disorders and it remains possible that there are differential changes in emotional 
reasoning between different disorder groups. For instance, emotional reasoning might change 
a lot during treatment for primary panic disorder, but relatively little for treatment of social 
anxiety disorder 
 As mentioned earlier, this was a preliminary investigation and additional studies using 
larger-size samples are required to adequately address the question of whether emotional 
reasoning changes with therapy. Nonetheless, these findings allow two tentative conclusions. 
First, individuals seeking treatment for an anxiety disorder appear to engage in emotional 
reasoning. Second, even though symptomatic improvement was evident in this small sample, 
a corresponding change in emotional reasoning tendencies did not appear to occur.  
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Figure 1. Summary of participant numbers and attrition. 
 
Assessed for eligibility (n = 48) 
Excluded (n = 11) 
Did not consent to participate: 
♦   Due to childcare commitments (n = 3) 
♦   Due to lack of time (n = 4) 
♦   Reason unclear (n = 3) 
Other reasons: 
• Due to high levels of distress at 
clinical assessment (n = 1) 
 
Lost to follow-up (n = 10) 
- Diagnosis of cancer (n = 1) 
- Moved interstate (n = 1) 
- Unclear (n = 8) 
 
Included in posttreatment assessment analyses despite 
posttreatment assessment occurring before the  
12th session (n = 4)† 
• Mean number of sessions attended between pretreatment and 
posttreatment assessments = 8.20 (SD = 3.08;  
Median = 9) 
• Mean duration of therapy in weeks = 21.04 (SD = 11.11;  
Median = 17) 
• Mean number of sessions per participant that included 
discussion of cognitive therapy strategies# = 4.32 (SD = 2.70; 
Median = 4) 
• Mean number of sessions per participant that included 
discussion of behavioural strategies# = 2.80 (SD = 3.07;  
Median = 2) 
Excluded from pretreatment and posttreatment analysis due to 
computer software problem (n = 1) 
 




Included (n = 37) 
Enrollment 
* The majority of participants who completed therapy by the 12th session had the frequency of their sessions 
reduced before the final session to ensure that progress was maintained. 
# A focus of a session was considered to involve at least 20 minutes of discussion. Thus, a single therapy session 
could have included more than one type of strategy (e.g., cognitive and behavioural). 
† Due to a change of employment for the first author, four participants were assessed for their “posttreatment” 





Table 1. Sample characteristics at pretreatment assessment (N = 36). 
  Mean (Median; SD) 
Age  32.6yrs (30; 12.1) 
  n (%) 
Gender  Female = 26 (72.2%) 
Marital status  Married or de facto = 18 (50.0%) 
Highest level of education completed  
 Primary or high school 14 (38.8%) 
 Certificate, Diploma or Advanced 
Diploma 
17 (47.2%) 
 Degree 5 (13.8%) 
Currently engaged in paid employment 18 (50.0%) 
Current chronic medical condition Any = 15 (41.7%) 
 Asthma 7 (19.4%) 
 Other# 11 (30.6%) 
Currently taking a psychotropic medication 22 (61.1%) 
Currently receiving therapy elsewhere 3 (8.3%) 
# Some participants had multiple chronic medical conditions, including asthma. Thus, the 






Table 2. Numbers and percent of participants with co-occurring disorders at pretreatment (N 
= 36). 
 n (%) 
Major depressive episode 18 (50.0%) 
Dysthymia 7 (19.4%) 
Panic disorder with or without 
Agorgaphobia 
7 (19.4%) 
Agoraphobia without Panic disorder 4 (11.1%) 
Social anxiety disorder 10 (27.8%) 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder 4 (11.1%) 
Posttraumatic stress disorder 5 (13.9%) 
Generalised anxiety disorder 12 (33.3%) 
Specific phobia 13 (36.1%) 
Hypochondriasis 2 (5.6%) 







Figure 2. Changes in anxiety and depression self-report scores from pre to posttreatment (n = 
25). 
 
* Change in mean scores from pre to posttreament were significant (for BAI, 95% CI [4.60, 
17.24]; for BDI-II, 95% CI [4.92, 13.64]). 




















Figure 3. Mean emotional reasoning difference scores at pre and posttreatment assessment (n = 25). 
 
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
* Ratings for "Incompetent" decreased to a significant extent from pre to posttreatment after correction for multiple comparisons (repeated 







Pretreatment mean 18.14 20.84 16.67 14.58 11.54 14.13
Posttreatment mean 19.23 22.51 14.61 13.21 3.85 12.05
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